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STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND MARITIME TERRORISM
IN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA: PERSUADING
INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA TO TAKE ADDITIONAL
STEPS TO SECURE THE STRAIT
Tammy M. Sittnickt
Abstract: The Strait of Malacca, located between Indonesia and Malaysia, and
opening into the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Singapore, is not only one of the world's
busiest and most vital waterways, but also a likely target for maritime terrorists. High
levels of piracy and the presence of numerous regional terrorist organizations suggest the
Strait is particularly vulnerable to a maritime terrorist attack. Such an attack would
significantly disrupt international trade and could inflict billions of dollars in damage to
the global economy.
Primary responsibility for the security of the Strait lies with the coastal states of
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Despite recent efforts by the coastal states to
improve security in the Strait, sustained piracy rates indicate such efforts have had a
limited effect. Although Singapore has expressed a willingness to consider additional
steps, Malaysia and Indonesia have refused to take further steps to improve security, such
as implementing joint patrols or allowing for the presence of extra-regional forces,
arguing such steps infringe upon their sovereignty.
Current international piracy and maritime terrorism laws do not provide an effective
mechanism for addressing the security threat in the Strait or for encouraging Malaysia
and Indonesia to take additional available steps. Emerging international terrorism law,
however, may impose liability on Malaysia and Indonesia for a maritime terrorist attack
in the Strait unless they improve the security of this vital international shipping route.
I. INTRODUCTION
On a moonless night in March 2003, a dozen men dressed in black
climbed aboard the Indonesia chemical tanker Dewi Madrim as it transited
through the Strait of Malacca, the narrow waterway located between the
coastal states of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.' After tying up the
crew, the hijackers steered the vessel for an hour through the Strait before
2leaving with some of the ship's equipment and technical documents. The
attack on the Dewi Madrim in the Strait of Malacca is representative of the
growing tide of crime that has turned one of the world's busiest waterways
t The author would like to thank the Editorial Staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal,
especially Elizabeth Tutmarc, Karen Breckenridge, Hannah Sauna, and Doug Steding. The author
sincerely thanks Professor Craig H. Allen of the University of Washington School of Law for his guidance
and valuable suggestions. The author dedicates this Comment to her father, Robert Sittick. Any errors or
omissions are the author's own.
1 Simon Elegant, Dire Straits, TIME ASIA, Dec. 6, 2004, at http://www.time.com/time/asia/
magazine/printout/0, 13675,501041206-832306,00.html (last visited May 31, 2005).
2 Id.
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into one of the most dangerous. Although nations have intensified land and
air security against the threat of terrorism, record levels of piracy and the
threat of maritime terrorism still jeopardize the safety of the world's
waterways. Nowhere is maritime violence more problematic than in
Southeast Asia, especially along the Strait of Malacca.3
Southeast Asia has the highest number of pirate attacks and incidents
of maritime violence globally.4 Of these attacks, the greatest number occur
within Indonesia's territorial sea.5 Far from being a relic of the past, modem
pirates and sea robbers are highly sophisticated and pose a significant threat
6to ships and their crews. According to the International Maritime Bureau
("IMB"), pirate attacks are on the rise in the Strait of Malacca.7
As attacks on vessels increase in number and violence, security
experts warn that terrorists may resort to pirate-style tactics, or work in
concert with pirates, to perpetuate acts of maritime terrorism.8 Numerous
militant Islamic organizations operate in Southeast Asia. 9 Many of these
organizations have ties to Al Qaeda, whose strategy is to attack "soft"
economic targets.' 0 As one of the world's busiest shipping lanes and a
natural "choke point," the Strait of Malacca is a logical "soft" economic
3 The term "Malacca Strait" refers to the waterway located between Indonesia and Malaysia
emptying into the Strait of Singapore. Some commentators use the term Straits of Malacca to refer both to
the Malacca and Singapore Straits. See MICHAEL LEIFER, INTERNATIONAL STRAITS OF THE WORLD:
MALACCA, SINGAPORE, AND INDONESIA 54 (1978) (showing a map of the Malacca and Singapore Straits).
4 See INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY: JANUARY I-DECEMBER
31, 2004: ATTACKS IN SE ASIA, INDIAN SUB. CONT., AND FAR EAST, at http://www.iccwbo.orghomel
newsarchives/2005/images/Piracy-maps/Piracy-maps_2004.asp (last visited May 31, 2005) [hereinafter
PIRACY MAPS].
5 Of the 325 reported attacks on merchant ships worldwide during 2004, ninety-three occurred in
Indonesian waters. Press Release, International Maritime Bureau, Annual Death Toll from Piracy Rises
(Feb. 7, 2005), at http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news-archives/2005/2004-piracy.asp (last visited May 31,
2005) [hereinafter IMB Press Release].
6 See Simon Montlake, Pirates Ahead!, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 18, 2004, at 13.
7 IMB Press Release, supra note 5. During 2004, thirty-seven pirate or armed robbery attacks
occurred in the Strait of Malacca. See PIRACY MAP, supra note 4.
8 Efthimios Mitropoulos, Secretary-General of the IMO, Address at the Fifth Regional Seapower
Symposium for the Mediterranean and Black Sea Navies (Oct. 13, 2004), at http://www.imo.org/newsroom
/mainframe.asp?topicid=847&doc-id=4364 (last visited May 31, 2005).
9 MARK MANYIN ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 2-4
(updated Aug. 13, 2004), at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/35795.pdf (last visited May 31,
2005) [hereinafter CRS TERRORISM REPORT].
'0 Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, Address before the
Energy Security Council (Apr. 5, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/mds/rls/rmV31917.htm (last
visited May 31, 2005) (noting terrorists have shifted toward attacking soft targets, such as economic or
capitalist targets such as the Bali night club) [hereinafter Taylor Speech].
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target for those who wish to perpetrate a terrorist attack that would seriously
harm the global economy."
The Strait of Malacca is located mostly within the territorial waters of
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia.1 2  These states have primary
responsibility for ensuring the safety of the Strait.' 3  Despite numerous
unilateral, bilateral, and trilateral efforts by the three coastal states to
improve maritime safety,' 4 piracy rates in the Strait of Malacca remain
high.' 5  Current efforts are hindered by inadequate patrol arrangements,
which do not allow for cross-border pursuit, and the coastal states' lack of
sufficient resources.' 6 Of particular concern is Indonesia. Not only do most
attacks occur within Indonesia's territorial waters, but Indonesia lacks the
necessary resources to adequately patrol its waters.' 7 Despite offers by user
nations, including Japan and the United States,' 8 Malaysia and Indonesia
have refused to allow extra-regional patrols or cross-border patrols, claiming
sovereignty concerns.19
Given the importance of the Strait to international shipping and the
potential economic impact a maritime terrorist attack could have on the
global economy, the question arises whether a legal regime exists that
compels the coastal states to take additional steps to secure the Strait. This
Comment argues that while current piracy laws do not provide an adequate
mechanism for addressing the security concerns in the Strait of Malacca,
emerging duties under international terrorism law may impose responsibility
on Malaysia and Indonesia for a maritime terrorist attack unless they take
additional available steps to ensure the safety of the Strait. Part H outlines
the economic importance of the Strait and its vulnerability to a possible
1 See Montlake, supra note 6; Efthimios Mitropoulos, Keynote Address at the IMO ASEAN
Regional Forum Conference Regional Co-operation in Maritime Security (Mar. 4, 2005), at
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/display.asp?number=-2383 (last visited May 31, 2005).
12 See LEIFER, supra note 3, at 54.
13 See discussion infra Part lIl.A.
Id.
'5 IMB Press Release, supra note 5 (reporting that hijackings of tugs and barges and the kidnapping
of crew members were on the rise, especially in Indonesian waters, in the Northern Malacca Straits).
16 See discussion infra Part III.B.
17 Id.
18 For several years Japan has offered to assist with patrolling the Strait. See, e.g., Forging a New
Japan, ASIA TtMES, Feb. 22, 2000, at http://www.atimes.com/japan-econBB23DhO I.html (last visited May
31, 2005) (discussing the possibility of Japan sending its Maritime Safety Agency to help patrol the Strait
of Malacca). In March 2005, responding to a pirate attack on a Japanese tugboat in the Strait of Malacca,
Japan once again proposed sending the Japanese Coast Guard to patrol the Strait. The coastal states,
however, have rejected Japan's proposals. Pirates Hijacked Our Boat to Attack Tug: Fisherman, THE
JAPAN TtMEs, Mar. 19, 2005, at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn 20 0 5O3 I9a6.htm (last
visited May 31, 2005). For discussion of a U.S. proposal see infra Part IlI.B.
"9 See infra Part III.B.
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maritime terrorist attack. Part III discusses the current efforts by the coastal
states to improve security in the Strait and why sovereignty concerns have
prevented Indonesia and Malaysia from taking additional steps. Part IV
analyzes the adequacy of the international piracy regime in addressing the
threat of maritime terrorism. Part V presents a case for potential state
responsibility under emerging international terrorism law if additional
actions are not taken by the coastal states. Finally, Part VI suggests
supplemental steps the coastal states can take to avoid responsibility for a
maritime terrorism attack in the Strait of Malacca.
II. THE STRAIT OF MALACCA IS PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO A
MARITIME TERRORIST ATTACK DUE TO ITS ECONOMIC
IMPORTANCE AND THE REGION'S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO TERRORISM AND
PIRACY
The Strait of Malacca is the primary shipping passageway between the
Indian and Pacific Oceans 20 and perhaps the world's busiest strait.21 Five
hundred and twenty nautical miles in length and extremely narrow in
places,22 the Strait of Malacca is transited by more than 50,000 vessels each
23year. Any serious disruption to the flow of maritime traffic through the
Strait due to a collision or sinking of a ship, for example, would have a
"widespread and far-reaching detrimental effect,, 24 inflicting billions of
dollars in damage to the world economy.
25
The narrowness and congestion of the Strait require transiting vessels
to reduce speed, making them vulnerable to attacks. Consequently, the
Strait of Malacca is considered one of the most dangerous areas in the world
for ships.26 Additionally, the presence of local radical Islamic groups in the
20 BHABANI SEN GUPTA ET AL., THE MALACCA STRAITS AND THE INDIAN OCEAN: A STUDY OF THE
STRATEGIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF A CONTROVERSIAL SEA-LANE 11 (1974).2' Tamara Renee Shie, Ports in a Storm?: The Nexus Between Counterterrorism,
Counterproliferation, and Maritime Security in Southeast Asia, 4 ISSUES & INSIGHTS 7 (Jul. 2004), at
http://www.csis.org/pacfor/issues%5CvO4nO4_pdf.pdf (last visited May 31,2005).
" The narrowest point within the Strait of Malacca is only 1.5 miles wide. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, WORLD OIL TRANSIT CHOKEPOINTS, Apr. 2004, at http://www.eia.doe.
gov/cabs/choke.html#maacca (last visited May 31, 2005) [hereinafter WORLD OIL CHOKEPOINTS] (noting
the Phillips Channel is the narrowest point in the Strait).
23 id.
24 Press Release, International Maritime Organization, IMO to Take Straits Initiative (Nov. 19,
2004), at http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic-id= 114&docid-4467 (last visited May 31,
2005).
25 Gal Luft & Anne Korin, Terrorism Goes to Sea, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 61, 64 (2004).
26 Id. at 67.
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region raises concerns about a nexus between piracy and terrorism. Given
the importance of the Strait of Malacca to the global economy, the
navigational difficulties, and the threat posed by piracy and maritime
terrorism, the security of the Strait is of imminent concern.
A. The Strait of Malacca Is Vital to the Global Economy
The Strait of Malacca has played an important role in global trade for
28centuries. Early Indian, Chinese, Arab, and other international traders
transited the Strait.29 By the fifth century, the Strait of Malacca had attained
international prominence.30  Its strategic location has made it an object of
international rivalry since the fifteenth century. 3' The Portuguese, who
arrived in Malaysia in the early sixteenth century, 32 were superseded by the
Dutch, who seized control of the Strait in 1642. 33 In the late eighteenth
century, the British challenged Dutch prominence. 34  The Dutch-British
rivalry ended in 1824 with the signing of an agreement in which Britain
agreed to safeguard the Strait and keep it open to the Dutch and other
friendly nations.35
Today, the Strait of Malacca continues to be vital to international
trade, especially energy trade.36 Oil tanker traffic accounts for thirty to forty
percent of all transit shipping passing through the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore. 37 More than eighty percent of the oil imported by Japan, South
Korea, and China comes from the Persian Gulf via the Strait of Malacca.38
With Chinese oil imports from the Middle East increasing steadily, the Strait
of Malacca is likely to grow in strategic importance in coming years.
39
27 Shie, supra note 21, at 13; Andrew Holt, Plugging the Holes in Maritime Security, THE
JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION, May 6, 2004, at http://www.jamestown.org/publications details.php?volumeid
=400&issuejid=2945&articleid=236670 (last visited May 31, 2005).
28 DONALD B. FREEMAN, THE STRAITS OF MALACCA: GATEWAY OR GAUNTLET? 69 (2004).
29 Id. at 81.
30 LEIFER, supra note 3, at 6.
31 SEN GUPTA, supra note 20, at 13.
32 Id.
33 LEIFER, supra note 3, at 8.
34 SEN GUPTA, supra note 20, at 13.
" Id. at 13-14.
36 See WORLD OIL CHOKEPOINTS, supra note 22; Luft & Korin, supra note 25, at 61-62.
37 FREEMAN, supra note 28, at 114.
38 Michael Richardson, Terrorism: The Maritime Dimension, 3 TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA SERIES
1, 7, available at http://www.iseas.edu.sg/32004.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005).
39 See WORLD OIL CHOKEPOINTS, supra note 22.
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Closure of the Strait in the event of a terrorist attack would, therefore, have a
serious effect on the world's energy markets.4 °
B. The Prevalence of Terrorist Organizations in Southeast Asia and
Their Strategy of Attacking "Soft" Economic Targets Make the
Strait of Malacca a Logical Terrorist Target
Terrorism has been a major problem for many Southeast Asian
countries for decades. 41  Because of its political instability and numerous
Muslim separatist groups, Southeast Asia has been considered the "second
front" in the U.S. global campaign against terrorism. 42  For many years,
militant Islamic groups, including Jemaah Islamiyya ("JI"),43 Moro Islamic
Liberation Front ("MILF"),44 and Abu Sayyaf ("ASG"), 45 carried out
terrorist attacks against their governments as part of Islamic separatist
movements.46  Although once considered merely a regional threat, recent
revelations have exposed links between some of these regional groups and
Al Qaeda.4 7
40 See, e.g., Luft & Korin, supra note 25, at 65-7; Perils on the Sea, THE ECONOMIST, June 30, 2004,
37 (observing the cost of a terrorist attack that succeeds in disrupting world trade-especially in oil-could
be colossal).41 CRS TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 9, at 2.
41 Id. at 1.
43 Jemaah Islamiyah ("JI") is a militant Islamist group active in several Southeast Asian countries,
especially Indonesia. Founded in the 1960s by Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah Sungkar, JI's tated goal
is to create an Islamic state comprising Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the southern Philippines.
Initially it was thought to be the Southeast Asian affiliate of Al Qaeda. There is increasing evidence,
however, that while the two groups have a symbiotic relationship, they are discrete organizations with
differing, albeit overlapping agendas. See generally CRS TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 9, at 4-12
(describing the threat posed by Jemaah Islamiyah).
44 Moro Islamic Liberation Front ("MILF') operates primarily in the southern Philippines. The main
political objective of MILF has been separation and independence for the Muslim region of the southern
Philippines. MILF was linked to the February 24, 2000, explosion of two buses aboard a ferry in the
Philippines, which killed at least forty-five passengers and injured many others. It is suspected that JI
terrorists have trained at MILF camps in the Philippines. CRS TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 9, at 18.
45 Abu Sayyaf ("ASG"), which operates in the Philippines, emerged in 1990 as a splinter group
composed of former Moro National Liberation Front fighters and Filipinos who had fought against the
Soviets in Afghanistan. ASG is responsible for numerous attacks against Filipino and American targets,
including the February 2004 bombing of Super Ferry 14, a Philippine passenger ship, which killed 100
people, the May 2000 kidnapping of three Americans, two of whom were killed, and an October 2002
explosion, which killed a U.S. soldier in Mindanao. See generally LARRY NIKSCH, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, ABU SAYYAF: TARGET OF PHILIPPINE-U.S. ANTI-TERRORISM COOPERATION (Jan. 25,
2002) at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/8046.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005) (providing a
summary of Abu Sayyaf) [hereinafter CRS ABU SAYYAF REPORT].
46 See generally CRS TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 9; CRS ABU SAYYAF REPORT, supra note 45
(discussing terrorism in Southeast Asia).
47 Al Qaeda, Arabic for "the base," is an international terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden.
Al Qaeda is responsible for numerous terrorist attacks including the September HI, 2001, attacks on New
York City and Washington, D.C., the October 2000 U.S.S. Cole bombing, and the August 1998 bombings
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Since nations have strengthened security at political, diplomatic, and
military facilities, terrorists have turned toward attacking "soft" economic
targets.4 8  The JI bombings of a Bali nightclub in October 200249 and an
Indonesian JW Marriot hotel in August 200350 indicate that Southeast Asian
groups have also adopted this strategy. 51  Maritime targets, including
shipping channels such as the Strait of Malacca, appear to be logical
economic targets.52 One analyst warned: "Al Qaeda and its affiliates plan
strategically and over a very long time. They have done the aviation
spectacular in New York. They have done the trains spectacular in Madrid.
Will they do the maritime spectacular in Southeast Asia? ' 53
C. Many Possible Maritime Terrorism Scenarios Exist
Several possible maritime terrorist scenarios exist. As the 1985
hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro54 and the recent attack on a
Philippine ferry55 indicate, passenger ships, especially ferries and cruise
ships, are vulnerable targets. Such ships could either be blown up or used as
weapons against other ships or a seaport.56  Either scenario would likely
result in a large number of civilian casualties. Other possible attacks include
the use of shipping containers to smuggle weapons of mass destruction into
of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. See generally AUDREY KURTH
CRONIN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, AL QAEDA AFTER THE IRAQ CONFLICT (May 23, 2003),
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21529.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005) (summarizing terrorist actions taken by
A] Qaeda).
48 Taylor Speech, supra note 10.
'9 The Bali terrorist bombing occurred on October 12, 2002, in the town of Kuta on the Indonesian
island of Bali. The blast killed 202 people and injured 209, most of whom were foreign tourists. It is
considered the deadliest act of terrorism in Indonesian history. The bombing is sometimes referred to as
"Australia's 9-11" because Australia suffered the largest number of casualties in the bombing. CRS
TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 9, at 10.
50 On August 5, 2003, a car bomb exploded outside the J.W. Marriott in Jakarta killing twelve people
and injuring over 150. See, e.g., Dan Murphy, Indonesia Car Bomb Echoes Bali, CHRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR, 1, Aug. 6, 2003 (describing the Bali bombing).
51 Taylor Speech, supra note 10.
52 See, e.g., Montlake, supra note 6; Rear-Admiral Teo Chee Hean, Address at the opening of the
2nd Western Pacific MCMEX and DIVEX (Apr. 26, 2004), at http://www.mindef.gov.sg/display.asp?
number=-2073 (last visited May 31, 2005) (discussing threat to economic targets).
53 Greg Sheridan, Muslim Deaths Hit Region's War on Terror, THE AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 1, 2004, at
C24.
,4 Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 47 (2nd Cir. 1991) (summarizing the basic facts
of the incident).
55 See Bomb Caused Philippine Ferry Fire, BBC NEWS, Oct. 11, 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
asia-pacific/3732356.stm (last visited May 31, 2005).
56 Minister Warns Pirate Attacks Might be Linked to Terror Groups, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Mar. 2,
2004, (quoting Tony Tan, Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for Security and
Defense as saying, "The threat of a commercial vessel or cruise liner being hijacked and used as a floating
bomb against Singapore is a very serious one").
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a country and the use of a ship to launch an attack on a port city.
57
Additionally, attacks similar to those perpetrated against the U.S.S. Cole or
the French supertanker Limburg59 remain possible.
Another serious concern is the maritime equivalent of the September
1 1th attacks.60  If terrorists hijacked a ship, especially one carrying
flammable materials such as oil or liquefied natural gas, they would have the
potential to blow the ship up at one of the narrow points in the Strait of
Malacca, or ram the ship into another ship or port. The September 1992
collision in the Strait of Malacca between the tanker Nagasaki Spirit and the
container ship Ocean Blessing illustrates how easily terrorists could conduct
a similar, but more disastrous operation.
61
The Strait of Malacca is a vital shipping passageway, essential to the
world economy and energy markets. Already a hotbed for piracy and home
to numerous militant Islamic groups, the Strait of Malacca is a logical target
for a maritime terrorist attack aimed at disrupting the global economy. Not
only would a maritime attack result in the loss of life, but it could
significantly disrupt global shipping and have a tremendous impact on the
global markets.
57 The Container Security Initiative ("CSI") is a U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("U.S.
Customs") project designed to improve port security by preventing the smuggling of terrorist weapons in
ocean-going cargo containers. Under the CSI, the U.S. Customs enters into bilateral agreements with
foreign governments in order to identify potentially dangerous or suspicious cargo, increase sensors on
containers, and develop secure containers. Screening is done overseas before the cargo reaches U.S. ports.
As of November 12, 2004, thirty-two ports were operational under the CSI. The International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code, promoted by the UN's International Maritime Organization, went into effect
July 1, 2004; See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, CSI IN BRIEF, at http://www.customs.gov/
xp/cgov/border.security/internationalactivitiescsicsiin.brief.xml (last visited May 31, 2005); see
generally Jessica Romero, Comment, Prevention of Maritime Terrorism: The Container Security Initiative,
4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 597 (2003) (providing an overview of the CSI).
58 On October 12, 2000, while refueling at a Yemeni's port, an apparent suicide attack against the
505-foot destroyer created a forty-foot by forty-foot hole in the ship's hull, killing seventeen U.S. sailors
and injuring thirty-nine. See generally RAPHAEL PERL & RONALD O'ROURKE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, TERRORIST ATTACK ON USS COLE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2001) at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB55/crs200lOl3O.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005)
(providing background on the terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole).
59 The Limburg was a French tanker carrying more than 397,000 barrels of crude oil that was blown
up by a small boat, much like the way the U.S.S. Cole was attacked. See, e.g., France Says Tanker was
Attacked, BBC NEwS, Oct. 10, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/middle-east/2318031.stm (last
visited May 31, 2005) (summarizing and comparing the attacks and providing details on the Limburg
attack).
60 H.E. Jose Luis Jesus, Protection of Foreign Ships against Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: Legal
Aspects, 18 INT'L J. OF MARINE AND COASTAL L. 363, 389 (2003).
61 It is suspected that pirates were aboard at least one, if not both, of the vessels. The collision
resulted in a 40,000 ton crude oil spill. See JOHN S. BURNEtT, DANGEROUS WATERS: MODERN PIRACY
AND TERROR ON THE HIGH SEAS 134-48 (2003) (discussing the collision and efforts to salvage the vessels).
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D. The Piracy-Terrorism Nexus Increases the Likelihood of a Maritime
Terrorist Attack
The prevalence of piracy in the Strait of Malacca suggests that a
62maritime terrorist attack could easily be perpetrated. In 2004 there were
325 reported attacks on vessels worldwide.63 Of those, ninety-three occurred
in Southeast Asian waters and thirty-seven occurred within the Strait itself.
64
Because these attacks occurred in areas where Islamic militant groups such
as JI and ASG operate, it is easy to see why elevated piracy rates
demonstrate vulnerability.
65
The possible nexus between piracy and terrorism is bolstered further
by reports of terrorists posing aspirates and hijacking ships for the purpose
of training for a maritime strike. Although there has yet to be a successful
terrorist attack on a major shipping facility or shipping passageway, this may
be because terrorists do not yet have the necessary maritime craft and
seafaring skills.67 Incidents such as the hijacking of the Dewi Madrim,
however, suggest that terrorists are attempting to gain the requisite skills for
such an attack.68 According to Indonesia's state intelligence agency,
detained senior JI members admitted that the group has considered
launching attacks on ships in the Strait of Malacca. 69
Indeed, piracy and terrorism are similar in several ways, particularly
in the tactics of ship seizures and hijackings.70  Nonetheless, piracy and
terrorism are not interchangeable phenomena.71  Piracy is primarily
motivated by private gains, while terrorism is motivated by political
objectives.72 That is, while terrorists want to draw attention to their acts by
causing as much harm as possible, pirates seek to minimize attention and
unnecessary damage.73 Further, as discussed in Part IV, under international
62 Shie, supra note 21, at 13.
63 IMB Press Release, supra note 5.
64 See PIRACY MAPS, supra note 4.
65 Shie, supra note 21, at 13.
66 Id.; Perils on the Sea, supra note 40.
67 GRAHAM GERARD ONG, INSTITUTE OF SOUTH EAST ASIAN STUDIES, PRE-EMPTING MARITIME
TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 2 (Nov. 29, 2002), available at http://www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/
ggonov02.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005) (on file with the Journal).
6 Elegant, supra note 1.
69 Luft & Korin, supra note 25, at 63.
70 See Adam Young & Mark J. Valencia, Piracy, Terrorism Threats Overlap, WASH. TIMES, July 7,
2003, at A18.
71 Shie, supra note 21, at 13.
72 See infra note 118 and accompanying text (piracy is an act committed for private ends); infra note
128 and accompanying text (U.N. Report proposed definition of terrorism involves political motivation).
73 Young & Valencia, supra note 70.
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law the two crimes are identified and addressed differently.74 Although
piracy and terrorism are distinct crimes, the prevalence of piracy and armed
robbery in the Strait of Malacca exposes a security gap that terrorists could
exploit.75  Therefore, if the coastal states seek to minimize the risk of
maritime terrorism in the Strait, they can either reduce the threat of terrorism
directly, or reduce factors that allow for piracy, and in doing so collaterally
reduce the threat of terrorism. As discussed below, Indonesia and Malaysia
have not taken all available steps to either reduce the threat of terrorism
directly, or sufficiently increase domestic police activities to reduce piracy,
which would have the collateral effect of reducing terrorism.
III. ALTHOUGH CURRENT EFFORTS BY THE COASTAL STATES HAVE
FAILED TO SECURE THE STRAIT, MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA HAVE
REFUSED TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO IMPROVE SECURITY
Responsibility for the security and safety of the Strait of Malacca rests
76primarily with the coastal states. Although the coastal states have
undertaken various unilateral, bilateral 77  and, recently, trilateral
arrangements 78 in an effort to address safety and security concerns within the
Strait of Malacca, continued maritime violence rates indicate that such
agreements have had only a limited effect. 79  The effectiveness of these
arrangements is limited primarily by regional sensitivity over territorial
sovereignty. 80  Such concerns, espoused primarily by Indonesia and
Malaysia, have prevented the coastal states from engaging in joint patrols,
which would allow them to enter into each other's territorial seas without
first seeking that state's permission, and from allowing extra-regional forces
into the Strait.
81
74 See infra Part IV.A-B.
75 Shie, supra note 21, at 13.
76 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 2, 24, 34(1), 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (stating that "[t]he regime of passage through straits used for international
navigation established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the legal status of the waters forming
such straits or the exercise by the States bordering the straits of their sovereignty or jurisdiction over such
waters and their air space, bed and subsoil").
77 Peter Chalk, Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia, 101 MARINE STUD. 8-10 (1998).
71 See infra Part III.A.
17 IMB Press Release, supra note 5 (although global rates of piracy decreased in 2004, reported
incidents were on the rise in the Strait of Malacca).
80 Chalk, supra note 77, at 9; See infra Part III.B.
a' See discussion infra Part III.B.
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A. Efforts by the Coastal States Have Failed to Secure the Strait
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have taken various unilateral and
bilateral steps meant to ensure maritime safety in the Strait.82 Beginning in
1991 Singapore increased coastal patrols and allocated greater resources for
improving surveillance. 83 Similarly, Malaysia increased patrols of its coasts
through the use of anti-piracy commando units and a special marine police
force. 84  In response to pressure from Malaysia and Singapore, Indonesia
also increased maritime patrols.85 During 1992, in response to a large
number of maritime attacks on vessels in the Malacca and Singapore Straits,
the coastal states expanded efforts to include bilateral initiatives. 6 Although
these coordinated efforts reduced piracy initially,87 by 1995 maritime
violence rates once again increased.88
In 2004, shortly after the United States proposed sending Marines to
patrol the Strait, 89 Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore agreed to coordinate
trilateral patrols of the region.90  The trilateral patrols, code named
MALSINDO, have been underway since July 2004.91 MALSINDO involves
coordinated patrols in which the maritime security forces from the three
coastal countries patrol within their own territorial waters.92 Despite these
trilateral patrol efforts, piracy rates in the Strait of Malacca remain among
the highest in the world.
3
Lack of both adequate patrol arrangements and sufficient resources
have limited the effectiveness of the coastal states' efforts. Lack of
resources is particularly problematic for Indonesia, whose navy and
82 Chalk, supra note 77, at 8-9.
3 Id.
94 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 9.
87 Id.
88 Dana Dillon & Lucia Selvaggi, Stopping an Al Qaeda Attack in the Malacca Straits, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Jan. 28, 2004, at http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/edl20203a.cfm (last
visited May 31, 2005).
89 See infra Part 11.B.
90 See Spore, Malaysia, Indonesia Start Coordinated Malacca Straits Patrols, CHANNEL
NEwsAsIA, July 20, 2004, at http://www.channelnewsasia.comlstorieslsoutheastasialview/96556/1l.html
(last visited May 31, 2005) (on file with the Journal) [hereinafter Coordinated Patrols].
91 Press Release, MINDEF, Launch of Coordinated Patrols-MALSINDO--Malacca Straits
Coordinated Patrol (July 20, 2004), at http://www.mindef.gov.sg/display.asp?number=2170 (last visited
May 31, 2005).
92 Alastair Wanklyn, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia Making Right Moves Against Piracy: Think
Tank, CHANNEL NEwsASA, Oct. 20 2004, at http://www.channelnewsasia.comstories/singaporelocalnews
/view/l 12596//.html (last visited May 31, 2005) (on file with the Journal).
93 IMB Press Release, supra note 5 (reporting that although global rates of piracy decreased in 2004,
reported incidents were on the rise in the Strait of Malacca).
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maritime police remain weak and under-budgeted. 94 Reports suggest that
only thirty percent of Indonesia's navy, which is comprised of fourteen
warships and fifty-seven patrol boats plus a fleet of support vessels, is
seaworthy.95 Such a limited capacity provides an invitation to piracy on the
Indonesian side of the Strait. This lack of resources is further exacerbated
by the recent tsunami that struck Indonesia on December 26, 2004.96 Given
the enormous damage caused to Indonesia by this natural disaster, it is likely
that the government is not in a position to contribute significant resources to
improve its maritime security capabilities.
B. Malaysia and Indonesia Have Rejected Options That Would Improve
Security in the Strait, Claiming Such Steps Infringe Upon Their
Sovereignty
Even though options for strengthening security efforts in the Strait of
Malacca exist, the coastal states, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia, have
rejected extending current efforts, claiming sovereignty concerns.97 The
current coordinated patrol efforts were initially conceived as joint patrols,
which would have allowed for vessel sharing and cross-border agreements.98
However, after initially agreeing to joint patrols, Malaysian and Indonesian
officials reconsidered and approved coordinated patrols only.99 Malaysia's
Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak explained: "We have to respect the
cardinal principle of national sovereignty. '' °
Similarly, Malaysia and Indonesia rejected the possibility of extra-
regional patrols of the Strait. During his March 31, 2004, testimony before
the House Armed Services Committee, Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander
of the U.S. Pacific Command, suggested the possibility of a U.S.-led
Regional Maritime Security Initiative ("RMSI") to improve security in the
94 Id.
95 INSTITUTE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL SECURITY, CHILLY RESPONSE TO U.S. PLAN TO DEPLOY
FORCES IN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA, May 24, 2003, at http://www.iags.org/n0524042.htm (last visited
May 31, 2005).
96 The tsunami struck Indonesia's Aceh Province, killing thousands of people and inflicting
tremendous damage. As of April 2005, the number of dead or missing in Indonesia was estimated to be
over 160,000. Indonesia Trims by 60% Number of Missing From Tsunami Disaster, BLOOMBERG NEWS,
Apr. 7, 2005, available at http://www.bloomberg.coff/apps/news?pid=10000080&sid=a8x5LqH58DOM&
refer=asia (last visited May 31, 2005).
97 See infra Part III.B.
98 Coordinated Patrols, supra note 90.
99 Malaysia, Indonesia Rule Out Joint Patrols in Malacca Straits, CHANNEL NEWSASIA, July 1,
2004, at http:llwww.channelnewsasia.com/stories/southeastasiaview/93163l1.html (last visited May 31,
2005) (on file with the Journal).
100 Id.
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Strait of Malacca.1"1 The stated common goal of the RMSI is to develop a
partnership of willing nations to enhance capabilities and leverage capacities
through unity of effort to identify, monitor, and intercept transnational
maritime threats consistent with existing international and domestic laws.
10 2
In his testimony, Fargo indicated that such an initiative could involve
potentially putting "Marines on high speed vessels so that we can use boats
that might be incorporated with these vessels to conduct effective
interdiction."'
10 3
While Singapore favored U.S. military presence in the region,
Malaysia and Indonesia responded negatively, characterizing the RMSI as a
threat to their national sovereignty. 1°4 Deputy Prime Minister Razak said
"control of the Strait is the sovereign prerogative of Malaysia and Indonesia,
and U.S. military involvement is not welcome."105 Indonesia asserted that
the waters of the Strait of Malacca are part of the territorial waters of the
coastal states over which they have sovereignty, and the security of the Strait
is the responsibility of the coastal states. 06  Malaysia and Indonesia also
insisted that they have the capability to ensure the Strait's security.
107
Despite efforts by the coastal states to improve security within the
Strait of Malacca, sustained piracy rates indicate that such efforts have
yielded limited success. Although options exist for improving security in
the Strait, Malaysia and Indonesia have been unwilling to allow either cross-
border agreements or extra-regional patrols. Instead, Malaysia and
Indonesia argue that those measures are incompatible with the principles of
state sovereignty. As discussed below, the current international piracy
regime does not provide a mechanism to effectively address the security
101 Regarding U.S. Pacific Command Posture: Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2005 National Defense
Authorization budget request from the Department of Defense before the House Armed Services Comm.,
108th Cong. 46 (2004) (statement of Adm. Thomas B. Fargo, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific
Command).
'02 For a summary of the RMSI see JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP FOR COMBATING
TERRORISM, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NAVY PACIFIC COMMAND, STRATEGY FOR REGIONAL
MARITIME SECURITY (2004), available at http://www.pacom.rilrmsi/RMSI%20Strategy%
2 Nov%
2004.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005).
103 Regarding U.S. Pacific Command Posture: Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2005 National Defense
Authorization budget request from the Department of Defense before the House Armed Services Comm.,
108th Cong. 46 (2004) (transcript of Adm. Thomas B. Fargo, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific
Command).
104 id.
1o Ji Guoxing, U.S. RMSI Contravenes UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 29 PACNET, July 8,
2004, at http:llwww.csis.orglpacforlpac0429.pdf (last visited May 7, 2005).
106 Nugroho Wisnumurti, Former Director General for Political Affairs, Indonesia's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Editorial, Upholding Security in the Malacca Straits, THE JAKARTA POST, Apr. 12, 2004,
at http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20 0 4 04 12 .F 3 (last visited May 31, 2005)
(articulating the Indonesian position on the proposed deployment of U.S. forces).
107 Malaysia, Indonesia Rule Out Joint Patrols in Malacca Straits, supra note 99.
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concerns in the Strait, nor does it provide a mechanism to overcome
Malaysia's and Indonesia's sovereignty concerns. Emerging international
terrorism law, however, which imposes a duty on states to prevent terrorism,
provides an argument that unless Indonesia and Malaysia take the steps
available for securing the Strait, they will bear responsibility for any such
attack.
IV. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL PIRACY AND MARITIME TERRORISM LAWS
INADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE TERRORISM THREATS IN THE MALACCA
STRAIT
Although the security threat posed by maritime terrorism in the Strait
of Malacca is widely recognized, current international piracy and maritime
terrorism regimes are weak tools for preventing and suppressing such
attacks. 10 8  The traditional definition of piracy, according to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"), addresses violence
only on the high seas. Much of the Strait of Malacca, however, is located
within the territorial seas of Indonesia, Malaysia, or Singapore.' 9
Therefore, the piracy laws in the UNCLOS do not apply to much of the
Strait of Malacca. l10 Other definitional requirements in the UNCLOS
preclude the applicability of piracy laws to acts of maritime terrorism."'
Furthermore, despite the international community's attempt to respond to the
threat of maritime terrorism with the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation ("SUA
Convention"), 1 2 the SUA Convention is presently inapplicable to the Strait
of Malacca because not all of the coastal countries are parties. 13 Even if
Malaysia and Indonesia became parties, the SUA Convention provides
lo Robert C. Beckman, Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Southeast Asia: The
Way Forward, 22 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 317, 328 (1997).
109 MICHAEL LEIFER, supra note 3, at 54.110 At its western entrance, the Strait of Malacca is spacious and the coasts of Indonesia and Malaysia
are separated by about 200 miles of water. The Strait, however, begins to take on the shape of a funnel as
vessels proceed through it in a southeasterly direction. By the time a line of latitude is reached just South
of 3°N and just below One Fathom Bank, the territorial waters of Indonesia and Malaysia begin to overlap.
The narrowest breadth between opposite shores of the Strait of Malacca-at the south-western tip of the
Malay Peninsula-is 8.4 nautical miles, though the navigable channel for deep draught vessels is much
narrower. Id. at 53.
:11 See infra Part IV.A.
112 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 222, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 668 [hereinafter SUA Convention].
113 IMO, STATUS OF CONVENTION BY COUNTRY, available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastData
Only.asp/datajid%3D11596/status.xls (last visited May 31, 2005) [hereinafter CONVENTION STATUS].
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inadequate preventative measures and thus does little to reduce the threat of
maritime terrorism."14
A. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Does Not
Provide an Adequate Mechanism for Addressing Maritime Terrorism
in the Strait
The definitional requirements for piracy in the UNCLOS preclude its
application to maritime terrorism in the Strait of Malacca. Article 101 of the
UNCLOS defines piracy under international law. 1 5 It is generally accepted
that this definition of piracy reflects long-standing customary international
law." 6  Subject to certain restrictions, any state can exercise jurisdiction
over a ship suspected of piracy on the high seas.'17 According to the
UNCLOS, piracy consists of any of the following:
(a) any illegal acts of violence, detention, or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, person or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship
or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship
or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act
described in subparagraph (a) or (b) of this article." 8
The piracy provisions of the UNCLOS apply to any area beyond the
territorial sea of a state." 9  The UNCLOS recognizes three major
"4 See infra Part IV.B.
115 UNCLOS, supra note 76, art. 101. This definition, however, does not necessarily reflect
municipal piracy laws. Id.
11 Customary international law is binding on states although it is not written, but rather adhered to
out of sense of legal obligation. When enough states have begun to behave as though something is law, it
becomes law "by use." NATALINO RONzrrri, The Law of the Sea and the Use of Force Against Terrorist
Activities, in MARrTIME TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (Natalino" Ronzitti ed., 1990).
117 UNCLOS, supra note 76, art. 105 (stating that "[on the high seas, or in any other place outside
the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by
piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board").
,' Id. art. 101.
19 Id. art. 58.
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jurisdictional zones: territorial waters of a state, the exclusive economic zone
("EEZ"), and the high seas. 120  Under the UNCLOS, a state's territorial sea
may extend up to twelve nautical miles from its baseline. 121 Subject to the
right of innocent passage through the territorial sea and to transit passage
rights through straits and archipelagic waters, the coastal state has the same
sovereignty over its territorial sea as it has with respect to its land
territory. 22 A state can also claim up to 200 miles from its coastlines as part
of its EEZ. Within its EEZ, a state has sovereign rights to exclusively
exploit the marine resources. 124  Article 58 provides that the UNCLOS
125piracy provisions apply to the EEZ as well as the high seas. Much of the
Strait of Malacca, however, is located within the territorial waters of
Malaysia, Indonesia, or Singapore.'
26
The above mentioned definition's requirements of piracy jure
gentium 127 also prevents maritime terrorism from being included within the
ambit of international piracy laws because acts of terrorism are committed
for public political ends. 128 Thus, in addition to its failure to satisfy the high
seas requirement, acts of maritime terrorism in the Strait of Malacca fail to
meet the private ends requirement. 129 Furthermore, the UNCLOS definition
of piracy includes a "two-ship requirement" that the illegal act be committed
by one ship against another ship. 30 This requirement precludes numerous
maritime terrorist acts from being classified as piracy, including a "maritime
"0 Id. arts. 2, 33, 55, 86 (providing the structure of the jurisdictional scheme of the UNCLOS).
121 Id. art. 3 (stating that "[e]very State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to
a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this
Convention").
122 1d arts. 2, 17 (allowing states to claim coastal waters as territorial waters and providing innocent
passage rights). Innocent passage through a state's territorial seas is a limited right. Article 19 lists
prohibited activities of a foreign state's ship. Id. art. 19.
123 Id. arts. 3, 33, 57 (establishing geographical limits of each zone of jurisdiction on the seas).
124 Id. art. 56 (stating that states only have a right to exploit marine resources in exclusive economic
zones).
'2' 11 art. 58.
126 See MICHAEL LEIFER, supra note 3, at 53-54.
127 Jure gentium translates to "by the law of nations." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 854 (7th ed. 1999).
128 The 2004 United Nations Report of the Secretary General's High-level Panel on Threat,
Challenges, and Change describes terrorism as "any action, in addition to actions already specified by the
existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566
(2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the
purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or
an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act." U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., at 48-9,
U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (2004).129 UNCLOS, supra note 76, art. 101(a).
130 The one-ship/two-ship requirement has been subject to some debate. See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee,
The New "Jamaica Discipline:" Problems with Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and the 1982 Convention on
the Law of the Sea, 6 CoNN. J. IN'L L. 127, 141-47 (1990) (commenting on the "private ends" controversy
and the "one ship/two ship" controversy stemming from the definition of piracy in UNCLOS).
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9/11" situation where passengers or crew already aboard a vessel hijack the
ship and use it as a weapon against a port facility. 131  Thus, the UNCLOS
definition of piracy is insufficient to deal with the maritime terrorism threat
facing ships transiting the Strait of Malacca.
B. In Addition to the Failure of International Piracy Laws to Provide a
Mechanism to Address Maritime Terrorism in the Strait, the SUA
Convention Is Also Inadequate
In response to the 1985 hijacking of the passenger vessel Achille
Lauro by members of the Palestinian Liberation Front, 132 Italy, supported by
Austria and Egypt, proposed a convention to address maritime terrorism.
133
The resulting SUA Convention was completed in Rome on March 10, 1988,
and entered into force on March 1, 1992.134 The SUA Convention closely
parallels the language of other multilateral terrorism conventions such as
those created to combat unlawful acts against the safety of air navigation,'
35
internationally protected persons,' 36 and the taking of hostages. 37 Article
3(1), which sets forth the offenses covered by the SUA Convention, states:
Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and
intentionally:
(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or
threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; or
(b) performs an act of violence against a person on board
a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that
ship; or
131 Justin S.C. Mellor, Missing the Boat: The Legal and Practical Problems of the Prevention of
Maritime Terrorism, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 341,379 (2002).
132 On October 7, 1985, the Achille Lauro, an Italian-flag cruise ship was hijacked by members of the
Palestinian Liberation Front, who had boarded the ship by posing as tourists. They took the ship's crew
and passengers hostage and demanded that Israel release fifty Palestinian prisoners. When their demands
were not met, the hijackers shot Leon Klinghoffer, a Jewish American who was paralyzed and in a
wheelchair, and threw his body overboard. See Klinghoffer, supra note 54 (summarizing the basic facts of
the incident).
133 For general information on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation see Tullio Treves, The Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, supra note 116, at 69.
134 SUA Convention, supra note 112.
135 The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; The Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565,974 U.N.T.S. 177.
136 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975.
137 Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, reprinted in 18 ILM 1456 (1979).
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(c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its
cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that
ship; or
(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means
whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that
ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers
or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational
facilities or seriously interferes with their operation, if any such
act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of a ship; or
(f) communicates information which he knows to be
false, thereby endangering the safe navigation of a ship; or
(g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the
commission or the attempted commission of any of the offences
set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (f)138
Each State Party is obligated to prosecute or extradite individuals
suspected of the included offenses' 39  Unlike the UNCLOS definition of
piracy,14° the SUA Convention does not contain the private ends or two-ship
requirements, nor does it include the requirement that an act occur on the
high seas.1
41
Despite elimination of the private ends, two-ship, and territorial
requirements, the SUA Convention does not sufficiently address the threat of
maritime terrorism, particularly within the Strait of Malacca. First, the SUA
Convention only imposes obligations on State Parties. 42  Although
Singapore is aparty to the SUA Convention, neither Indonesia nor Malaysia
has ratified it.1 3 Therefore, neither is obligated to fulfill its requirements.
Even if all three coastal states became parties, the SUA Convention's
reactive, not proactive, nature would still make it an insufficient means of
preventing terrorism. The primary function of the SUA Convention is not
138 SUA Convention, supra note 112, art. 3(1).
139 Id. art. 10(l).
140 UNCLOS, supra note 76, art. 101(a)(i).
141 SUA Convention, supra note 112, art. 3(1).
142 As of December 31, 2004, 115 States have become party to the SUA Convention. See
CONVENTION STATUS, supra note 113.
143 According to statements made by Ms. Wan Napsiah Salleh, Malaysia's Undersecretary, Territorial
and Maritime Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia is in the process of acceding to the
SUA Convention. Wan Napsiah Salleh, Strait of Malacca and the Challenges Ahead: A Malaysian
Perspective, Address at Maritime Institute of Malaysia's Conference on the Straits of Malacca 6-7 (Oct.
2004) at http://www.nima.gov.myhnimalhtmls/conferences/somO4/papers/wan-napsiah.pdf (last visited
May 31, 2005).
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the suppression of maritime terrorism, but the apprehension, conviction and
punishment of those who commit such acts.1  Only Article 13, which
requires states to take "all practicable means" to prevent the use of their
territories as bases for possible attacks, serves a preventative function.
45
Therefore, the SUA Convention is reactive as opposed to preventative in
nature, and does little to provide for the creation of a regime to stop
terrorism on the high seas or within the territorial waters of states.
Despite the international community's effort to address maritime terrorism,
the SUA Convention is of limited applicability to preventing maritime
terrorism in the Strait of Malacca.
The piracy laws of the UNCLOS and the anti-terrorism laws of SUA
Convention do not adequately address the threat posed by maritime
terrorism in the Strait of Malacca.1 47 Since most attacks in the Strait occur
in territorial waters, the piracy laws of the UNCLOS are inapplicable.
1 48
Similarly, the SUA Convention, even if applicable to the coastal states of
Malaysia and Indonesia, provides for a legal regime to deal with perpetrators
after an attack, not a regime that prevents them from perpetrating an attack
in the first place. 149  While international piracy and current maritime
terrorism laws do not provide an effective framework for addressing the
threat of maritime terrorism, emerging international law regarding state
responsibility for preventing terrorism may require the coastal states to take
actions to address the issue.
V. EMERGING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM LAW MAY IMPOSE LIABILITY
ON THE COASTAL STATES IF THEY Do NOT TAKE ADDITIONAL ACTION
TO SECURE THE STRAIT
Although existing international piracy and maritime terrorism laws do
not provide an effective mechanism to address maritime terrorism in the
Strait of Malacca, 150 emerging international terrorism law may impose
44 SUA Convention, supra note 112, art. 10(1) (creating an extradite or prosecute obligation for party
States).
145 SUA Convention, supra note 112, art. 13. Article 13 requires states to cooperate in the prevention
of offenses by: (a) taking all practicable measures to prevent preparation in their respective territories for
the commission of those offences within or outside their territories; (b) exchanging information in
accordance with their national law, and coordinating administrative and other measures taken as
appro riate to prevent the commission of offences set fourth in article 3. Id.
p6 Mellor, supra note 131, at 379.
17 See supra Part IV.A.
148 UNCLOS, supra note 76, art. 101 (UNCLOS piracy laws apply only to the high seas).
149 See supra Part IV.B.
15o See discussion supra Part IV.
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responsibility on the coastal states unless they take additional actions to
address the security issue. 151 Under principles of state responsibility, a state
bears responsibility for its conduct that breaches its international
obligations.152  States have a duty under customary international law to
exercise due diligence in preventing injuries to foreigners within their
territories. 153 Further, states have a duty not only to refrain from sponsoring
and supporting terrorism, but also to take steps to prevent terrorism in
accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373.154 Given
these international duties to prevent terrorism, Malaysia's and Indonesia's
refusal to consider available options for improving security in the Strait
arguably constitutes a breach of their international responsibilities to prevent
terrorism. As such, Malaysia and Indonesia could be responsible for
damages resulting from a maritime terrorism attack in the Strait.
A. A State Can Be Responsible for Acts Committed by Non-State
Actors If the State Breached Its Duty to Exercise Due Diligence in
Preventing or Responding to the Act
The law of state responsibility was most recently restated in the
International Law Commission's ("ILC") Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for International Wrongful Acts ("Draft Articles"). 55 Article 1 of the
Draft Articles states: "Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails
the international responsibility of that State."' 56  According to Article 2,
"[t]here is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting
of an action or omission: (a) Is attributable to the State under international
law; and (b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the
State."'57 States found responsible for an internationally wrongful act may
be liable for reparations to the injured state.15 8
An act by an individual is attributable to the state if the individual is
acting under the direction or control of that state, 159 the individual is
1' See infra Part V.B.152 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 56th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles].
153 Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 33
(May 24) [hereinafter Diplomatic and Consular Staff].
' ' S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1373 (2001) [hereinafter Resolution
1373].
:" Draft Articles, supra note 152.
'6 Id. art. 1.
157 Id. art. 2.
' Id. art. 34.
159 Id. art. 8.
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exercising elements of govemmental authority in the absence or default of
the official authorities, or the state subsequently endorses the individual's
actions.' 61 Acts or omissions of non-state actors are themselves generally
not attributable; 162 however, as discussed below, the state may incur
responsibility if it failed to comply with its international obligations to
prevent such acts or omissions. 6 3 With respect to terrorism, a state has an
obligation under customary international law to exercise due diligence in
protecting foreigners within its borders from acts of terrorism and specific
obligations under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, including the
obligation to take "the necessary" steps to prevent terrorism. 164 A state's
failure to comply with these obligations to prevent terrorism can result in
state responsibility if an attack occurs.
B. States Have a Duty to Exercise Due Diligence in Protecting
Foreigners Within Their Borders
Under customary international law, a state has a duty to safeguard the
security of aliens and their property in its territory. 165 A state not only has a
duty to abstain from directly taking measures (through actions of its own
organs) against the security of foreigners, 166 but it also has a duty to protect
foreigners from harm by non-state actors1 67 These duties, however, are not
absolute; rather, they are subject to a due diligence standard.168  Due
diligence requires that a state know of the need for action, have the means at
its disposal to perform its obligations, and fail to comply with those
obligations. 169 States that fail to exercise due diligence can be responsible
for damages caused by non-state actors.170
In Corfu Channel, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") held
Albania responsible for damage caused to two British ships that struck mines
160 Id. art. 11.
161 id. art. 9
162 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 166 (Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts, eds. 9th ed.
1992).
163 id.
l6 Resolution 1373, supra note 154.
165 Id.
166 OPPENHEIM, supra note 162, § 165.
167 Id. § 166.
168 id.
169 Diplomatic and Consular Staff, supra note 153, at 34; Scott M. Malzahn, Comment, State
Sponsorship and Support of International Terrorism: Customary Norms of State Responsibility, 26
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 83, 105 (2002).
170 See Corfu Channel (Gr. Brit. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 9) [hereinafter Corfu Channel].
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while transiting Albanian waters.' 71 Although the ICJ did not find Albania
responsible for laying the mines, 172 the Court concluded that because
Albania "constantly" kept watch over the channel and it was possible to
observe the minelaying, 173 Albania knew, or should have known, about the
mines. 174 Since Albania had knowledge of the mines, it had a duty to warn
ships proceeding through the strait of the danger to which they were
exposed.175 Albania was responsible for the damage because it was aware of
the danger and failed to take any actions to prevent the injury from
occurring. Therefore, Albania's failure to warn the British ships about the
danger constituted a breach of its duty to exercise due diligence.
76
Similarly, in the Diplomatic and Consular Staff Case the ICJ found
Iran responsible, with regard to the first phase of events, 177 for the takeover
of the United States Embassy in Tehran by a militant student organization.
178
The ICJ found that the students had no official status as recognized "agents"
or organs of the Iranian State and had not acted on behalf of Iran.
179
Nevertheless, Iran was "fully aware, as a result of the appeals for help made
by the United States Embassy, of the urgent need for action on their part." 1
80
Although Iran had the means to protect the U.S. Embassy and remove the
students, it failed to do so. Therefore, Iran's failure to respond to the
situation constituted a breach of its international obligations, including its
duty to exercise due diligence in protecting foreigners.181 Consequently, the
ICJ found Iran responsible for the damages that resulted from the
takeover.
82
Applying the above principles to the situation in the Strait of Malacca,
Indonesia's and Malaysia's refusal to take additional steps to secure the
Strait falls below the required due diligence standard. Given the sustained
high piracy rates in the Strait, 183 Malaysia and Indonesia, just like Albania
and Iran, are aware of the need for additional action on their part to improve
security of the Strait. Further, given the offers of extra-regional assistance
"'I d. at 12-13.
172 Id. at 16-17.
'i ld. at 20.
174 Id. at 22.
Id at 22-23.
176 Id. at 23. The coastal states' duty is partly codified in UNCLOS art. 24(2). UNCLOS, supra note
76.
:77 Diplomatic and Consular Staff, supra note 153, at 30.
71 Id. at 29-33.
179 Id. at 30.
'0 Id. at 33.
I' d. at 33-34.
182 Id. at 42-43.
183 IMB Press Release, supra note 5.
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and the option of allowing for cross-border patrols, Malaysia and Indonesia
have the means at their disposal to improve the security of the Strait.1 84
Therefore, Malaysia's and Indonesia's refusal to implement such available
steps is a breach of their duty to exercise due diligence to protect foreigners
within the Strait of Malacca. As such, Malaysia and Indonesia could be
responsible, under the principles of state responsibility, for damages
resulting from a maritime terrorist attack.
C. States Have a Duty to Take the "Necessary Steps" to Prevent
International Terrorism under United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1373
Not only do states have a general duty under customary international
law to exercise due diligence in protecting foreigners within their territories,
but they also have specific duties to prevent terrorism. 185  It is well
established that international law prohibits states from sponsoring or
supporting terrorism. 186 Article 2, paragraph 4, of the U.N. Charter provides
that states have a duty to refrain from making threats or employing force
against a foreign state.' 87 In 1992, in response to Libya's sponsorship of
international terrorism, the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 748, which states: "In accordance with the principle in Article 2,
paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, every state has a duty to
refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts
in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory
directed towards the commission of such acts.' 88 Indeed, this resolution is
consistent with the ICJ decision in Corfu Channel in that a state cannot
knowingly acquiesce to terrorist activity within its border without incurring
responsibility.
184 Admittedly, arrangements involving the use of extra-regional naval forces may infringe on the
coastal states' sovereignty; however, this infringement is not so great as to outweigh the seriousness of the
threat posed by piracy and maritime terrorism in the Strait. Furthermore, the international community has
recognized that under certain circumstances state sovereignty must yield to other principles, such as the
primacy of human rights. See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY,
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTEcT (2001) at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Comnission-Report.pdf (last visited
May 31, 2005).
' See infra Part V.C.
186 id.
187 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
' S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 42nd Sess., 3063rd mtg. at 52, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992).189 Corfu Channel, supra note 170, at 23.
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The duty not to acquiesce knowingly to terrorist activity also requires
that states refrain from harboring terrorists. 190 In response to the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States launched an attack in October of
that year against Afghanistan and its government, the Taliban. 191
Underlying the justification for the attack was that a state that harbors
terrorist organizations can incur responsibility if those organizations commit
a terrorist attack. 192  Given the lack of widespread criticism by the
international community for the attack on Afghanistan, it appears that it is
now accepted that a state can incur responsibility for harboring a terrorist
organization.
193
Given terrorism's threat to international security, the duty to refrain
from sponsoring, supporting, or acquiescing to terrorist activities has
evolved into a duty to take steps to prevent terrorism from occurring. 194 In
2001 the United Nations Security Council, acting under its Chapter VII
authority, passed Resolution 1373.195 Resolution 1373 requires all states to
freeze terrorists' assets, criminalize the financing of terrorism, bring
terrorists to justice, refrain from providing support to terrorists, and ensure
that all terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offenses in domestic
law. 196  It also requires states to take "the necessary steps" to prevent
terrorism.1 97 Since Resolution 1373 was passed by the Security Council, it is
binding on all member states.'" States that do not take "the necessary steps"
to prevent terrorism, as required by Resolution 1373, are in breach of their
international obligations and bear responsibility for the resulting injuries.1 9
9
Despite the requirement that states take "the necessary steps" to
prevent terrorism, Malaysia and Indonesia have refused to take available
steps to reduce the threat of maritime terrorism in the Strait. Given the
limitations of the current patrol regime 20 and the limited resources of
190 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4051st mtg., at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1267
(1999) (condemning the Taliban for "sheltering and training" terrorists).
'9' Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaida Training Camps and Taliban Military
Installations in Afghanistan, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1432 (Oct. 7, 2001).
192 See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
(2002).
193 For a summary of reactions to the U.S. actions against Afghanistan see JEFFERY L. DUNOFF ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 942-48 (2002) (noting the U.N. statements following the
U.S. air strikes concerned humanitarian issues).
194 See, e.g., Resolution 1373, supra note 154 (requiring States to take positive actions to prevent
terrorism).
195 Id.
196 id.
197 id.
1' U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
199 Draft Articles, supra note 152, art. 2.
2a See supra Part III.A.
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Malaysia and Indonesia, 201 acceptance of extra-regional assistance and
adoption of cross-border patrols are arguably not only necessary to prevent a
maritime terrorism attack, but are also consistent with the proactive
requirements and spirit of Resolution 1373. Therefore, Malaysia's and
Indonesia's failure to take such additional steps falls short of the
requirements of Resolution 1373 and places the two states in breach of their
international obligation.
Although states are not generally responsible for actions by
individuals, those actions may be attributed to the state if the state breached
202
a duty to prevent such acts. Malaysia's and Indonesia's refusal to
consider available options to address the threat of maritime terrorism in the
Strait of Malacca is a breach of their duties under international law to
exercise due diligence in protecting foreigners within their borders and to
take actions to prevent terrorism. As such, Malaysia and Indonesia could
incur responsibility for a maritime terrorist attack in the Strait.
VI. To AVOID STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR A MARITIME TERRORISM
ATTACK IN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA THE COASTAL STATES MUST
ENTER INTO CROSS-BORDER AGREEMENTS AND ALLOW FOR ExTRA-
REGIONAL PATROLS
Current efforts by the coastal states bordering the Strait of Malacca
are insufficient to satisfy the duty imposed by international law to prevent
terrorism. Therefore, they must take additional steps to avoid state
responsibility for acts of maritime terrorism in the Strait. First, the coastal
states should expand patrol efforts by forging cross-border agreements that
would give limited rights to the three coastal states to enter each other's
territorial waters. Second, the coastal states should permit extra-regional
forces to patrol the Strait.
A. Cross-Border Agreements Would Create a More Seamless and
Effective Security Regime
The current coordinated trilateral patrols do not allow naval vessels
from one coastal state to enter the territorial sea of another coastal state even
if they suspect a vessel is engaged in piracy or other acts of maritime
violence. °3 The existing tripartite agreement merely provides for increased
201 id.
202 See supra Part V.A.
203 See Coordinated Patrols, supra note 90.
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communication when such an incident arises.2°  Unfortunately, this
limitation provides an opportunity for a suspected criminal to escape from
205
authorities by fleeing into the territorial sea of a neighboring coastal state.
The coastal states could remedy this gap in the current tripartite
regime by entering into standing agreements that would grant cross-border
rights when pursuing suspect vessels. The United States has entered into
similar "entry-to-investigate" agreements with several South American and
Caribbean countries to facilitate counter-narcotics operations.2 °6 If coastal
states are unwilling to grant standing permission for cross-border pursuit, the
states could agree to integrated patrols, where one official from each country
would be on each patrol boat. These officials would be authorized to
grant entry rights if necessary.20 8 Given the overlapping territorial waters,
such agreements not only would be very practical in the Strait of Malacca,
but would also produce a more seamless security regime. 209
B. Extra-Regional Assistance Would Supplement the Resources of the
Coastal States
While allowing for cross-border pursuit may be a necessary step, it is
not adequate to prevent maritime violence in the Strait of Malacca. Even if
cross-border pursuit is permitted, the trilateral efforts are limited by the
individual capabilities of the three nations. 210  Therefore, the coastal states
should permit extra-regional forces to patrol the Strait at least until the
coastal states are able to secure the necessary resources to undertake
adequate patrols. Given the sovereignty concerns, however, countries such
as the United States and Japan, which have indicated interest in assisting
with patrols, should consider using national coast guards carrying armed law
enforcement persons instead of naval vessels. 211 Extra-regional forces in
addition to cross-border pursuit agreements would have an immediate effect
204 Id.
205 Malaysia, Indonesia Rule Out Joint Patrols, supra note 99 (quoting Captain PK Mukundan, of the
IMB, as describing "a ridiculous situation... where a law enforcement agency gives chase to pirate boats,
when it comes to the border territorial limits, the law enforcer stops, the pirate boat goes across and
escapes").
256 Joseph E. Kramek, Bilateral Maritime Counter-Drug and Immigrant Interdiction Agreements: Is
this the World of the Future? 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 121,134 (2000).
207 Such agreements are known as "shiprider agreements." The United States has entered into ship
rider agreements with several Caribbean states for counter-narcotic efforts. Id.2s Id.
209 See, e.g., Coordinated Patrols, supra note 90 (discussing current "hot" pursuit policies).
210 See discussion supra Part III.
211 Sam Bateman, Coast Guards: New Forces for Regional Order and Security, 65 EAST-WEST
CENTER I (Jan. 2003); Mitropoulos, supra note 11.
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on security of the Strait: the combination would provide for immediate
improvement of security capabilities and would allow for a more seamless
patrol regime.
VII. CONCLUSION
The presence of local terrorist groups, the prevalence of piracy, and
the importance of the regional maritime environment to international trade
make Southeast Asian waters, and specifically the Strait of Malacca, a likely
target for maritime terrorism. Despite the risk posed by maritime terrorism,
current efforts by the coastal states have failed to adequately address the
threat. By refusing to undertake steps that would improve security of the
Strait, Indonesia and Malaysia have breached their duty under international
law to prevent terrorism. As such, Indonesia and Malaysia could be
responsible for damages caused by a maritime terrorist attack. If these states
want to avoid responsibility for such an attack, they must take additional
steps, including allowing extra-regional forces to patrol the Strait and
permitting cross-border patrols. Such steps would ensure that the necessary
forces are present in the Strait and that such forces have the ability to patrol
the Strait without being hindered by border restrictions.
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